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1. Introduction
This abstract connects two very distinct research fields: evolutionary games, and ag-
gregating expert opinions described by imprecise probabilities. Indeed, evolutionary game
theorists usually do not know about imprecise probabilities, and imprecise probability
theorists have hardly ever heard of evolutionary games. Not surprisingly, there is no clear
relation between the two fields. But, I argue that interaction between these fields might
be promising. In fact, many very interesting issues arise when treating the aggregation
problem as an evolutionary game. I discuss and try to overcome some of the conceptual
difficulties that probably underly the non-existence of any literature connecting the two
fields. Then I indicate how evolutionary games can be used to help aggregating conflicting
opinions in a new, inspiring, and natural way.
Before starting my investigation, I feel that I must apologise for my extremely simplified
and inaccurate discussion of evolutionary game theory, as I only very recently got to know
about it. I however believe the discussion is sufficiently clear for imprecise probability
theorists to understand the possible benefit of incorporating the idea of natural selection
into aggregation.
2. Expert population as evolutionary game
An evolutionary game describes the process of natural selection using game theoretical
ideas. Basically, the evolution of a large population of so-called players is studied. Each
player repeatedly plays a strategy, and at every round, a player is replaced by a set of
new players, called children, each child playing the same strategy as its parent did in the
previous round. The number of children of a player is determined by (i) his own strategy,
and (ii) the way strategies are distributed over the population. It is then studied how the
distribution of strategies evolves through time. This model could describe for instance the
evolution of an ecological system consisting of asexually reproducing animals and plants
(players) with different types of genes (strategies), such as predator-prey systems.
This dynamical model can describe the expertise of a community of experts. Obviously,
experts can be considered as players. The strategy of an expert consists of updating his
“prior” expert model as he learns about other experts’ opinions and new evidence provided
by the world such as results of scientific studies, experiments etc. In this sense, any classical
aggregation technique is an updating strategy. The children inherit the “posterior” expert
model as their prior. The number of children is determined by how well the parent manages
to make useful assessments, and avoids saying stupid things. (Children are not to be taken
literally: they are understood to be new experts relying only on existing expert opinions
in order to make assessments.) We take it for granted that more reliable experts are more
likely to have more children.
3. Discussion, objections and possible resolutions
3.1. Games, imprecise probabilities and the benefit of natural selection. The
idea of aggregation as an updating strategy is very old: it was used in the seventies, see for
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instance [1], and has been heavily discussed in the literature, especially among Bayesians.
Recently, a game theoretic approach to aggregating imprecise expert opinions was studied
in [2]. In fact, already in the eighties it was argued that imprecise probabilities are much
better suited to represent expert opinions than their classical counterpart [4], a belief that
I share [3]. So the ideas of games and imprecise probabilities in aggregation are not new.
However, despite the vast amount of intensive discussions on aggregation found in the
literature, there is no agreement on how expert opinions should be combined. The ultimate
reason for this diversity is that what matters is not the exact method of aggregation, but
how the aggregate is eventually used. I believe that the idea of natural selection might
provide us with an interesting guide on what aggregation method is best for what use.
3.2. Measures of competence through imprecise probabilities. A competitive ex-
pert is able to make sufficiently precise assessments (“Saddam developed chemical and
biological weapons in the ’80s.”), but at the same time not exaggerating the precision of
this information (“He can now launch a nuclear missile within 45 minutes.”). One objec-
tive way to assess expert competence is by comparing his assessments with a hypothetical
perfect expert—one who knows everything that is going on in the expert field, and who
is able to present us with an expert model that is both precise and reliable. Of course,
such an expert hardly ever exists in the real world. (If he would exist, we would have no
reason to rely on aggregation anyway.)
But my argument is that, in computer simulations, such a perfect expert can be in-
troduced without any problem—although this expert remains purely hypothetical. The
computer can easily compare any expert model with the hypothetical perfect model, derive
a measure of expert competence from such a comparison, and favour the more competent
experts through natural selection. In this way, evolutionary games provide us with a filter
for competent strategies in a given expert environment—even if we do not know exactly
how to measure this competence in reality because in reality no such perfect expert exists.
In fact, imprecise probabilities are the perfect candidate for comparing expert opinions.
Because of their unifying character they are able to deal with many different expert repre-
sentations, such as classical probabilities, belief functions, possibility measures, Choquet
capacities, etc. in a consistent way. Moreover, imprecise probabilities provide a number
of fundamental concepts that can be easily related to measures of expert competence.
3.3. The use of simulating competing experts. Studying the dynamics of this system
might help us to describe the dynamics of expert information. Of much greater importance,
it might give us insight into what aggregation methods are the better ones in a given
domain of expertise. For example, should an expert only take into account new evidence
provided by the real world, or should he also take into account beliefs of other experts?
It might also give insight in what representations are best used in a given domain.
4. Conclusion
I identified a possible application of evolutionary games in aggregation. They might
be used to trace the most competent expert strategies, or aggregation methods, in a given
domain of expertise. Using linear-vacuous mixtures as expert models, and the imprecise
Dirichlet model as an updating model, first simulations indicate that a simple population
density weighted linear opinion pool performs generally the best, at least in the long run.
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